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I.

NIXODUCTIOW

One of a parent's worst fears is that his or her child will b-evictimized by a child molester.
Compounding these fwrs is a sense of frustration and outrage due to the seeming inability of the

criminal justice system to protect society fiom repeat sex offenders who target children. Recently,
several states have passed legislation allowing or directing state officials to impose treatment,
sometimes referred to as chemical castration, on particular ciasses of sex offenders.' Several other
states have attempted to pass similar legidati~n.~
Such legislation raises multiple intricate issues
including the efficacy of the treatment, the responsibilities of medical professionals implementingthe
provisions of the statutes, and the constitutionality of the statutes.
This comment addresses several of the legal and ethical issues surrounding state Iegisiation

that requires chemical treatment of sex offenders as a condition of their release fiorn incarceration.

The first section will set out basic information on chemical treatment of sexual deviance, the general

eEcacy of this treatment, and the efficacy of the treatment as it will likely be appfiedby the statutes

in force. Some medical ethjcai issues implicated by the efficacy ofthe treatment will also be explored.
The second section will address two related issues of consent. Legal and ethical requirements

for informed consent may raise several ethical and policy issues for medical professionals
implementing statutory provisions. Consent may also affect a sex offender's ability to assert

'CAI.,.PENAL CODE5 645 (West 1998); GA.CODE ANN. $8 16-6-4 & 42-9-44.2 ( 1 998);
FLA.STAT.ch. 794.0235 (1998);Mom. CODEANN. $45-5-5 12 (7 998);LA. REV.STAT.A m . 3
1 5 5 3 8 (West 1998).
'See e.g,N.M. Senate Bill 617 from the 43rd Legislature, first session, 1997. This bill,
proposing chemical treatment as a condition of parole for persons convicted of criminal sexua!
penetration of children under 13 years of age, passed the Senate, but never made it out of

committee jn the House.

-
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constitutional claims regarding chemical treatment. While many constitutional questions are
implicated by these statutes3, this comment will focus on the impact of consent on claims based on
substantive due process and cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, this comment will explore general

policy issues surrounding legislation authorizing chemical treatment for sex offenders.

LI.

EFFICACY OF CHEMICAL TREATMENT FOR SEXUAL D E W C E
Statutes authorizing chemical treatment of sex offenders may seek to punish or to treat sex

offenders. These statutes were likely passed, in part, because of societal perceptions that the criminal
justice system has failed to attain the goals of punishment through traditional methods such as
incarceration. Society, in punishing criminals, seeks to serve several purposes. Among these are
retribution, deterrence,incapacitation, and rehabilitati~n.~
Incarceration of sex offendersserves some,
-.

but not all, of the purposes of punishment. It certainly sewes the purposes of retribution and

incapacitation during the term of incarceration. Depriving the offender of his freedom not only
punishes the offender in the classic retributive sense, but also prevents him .from committing sex
ofknses on the general public during the term of his incarceration. Arguably, incarceration may also

3See

e.g., Daniel L. Icenogle, SentencingMale Sex QfSeenders to the Use oJBioZogica2

Treatment, 15 J. LEGALIVIED. 279, June, 1994 (discussing a potential Equal Protection Clause
violation based on gender discrimination); Larry Helm Spalding, Floricla 's 1997 Chemical
Castration Law: A Return to the DarkAges, 25 F%A. ST.U. L.REV. 117, Winter 1998 (discussing
a potential violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause); Karen J. Rebish, Nipping the Problem in the
Bud: The Comtitutiomlzty of California's Castration Law, 14 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM.RTS. 507,
Winter 1998 (discussing a possible violation of the First Amendment protection of freedom of
expression); Beth Miller, A Review of Sex Offender Legislation, 7-SPGKAN.J.L.&PUB.POL?
40, Spring 1998 (discussing the potential for violation of the Ex Post Fact Clause).
4

S H. KADISH
~ & STEPHEN
~
J. SCHULHOFER,
~
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES

CASESAND MATERIALS101-13 1 (6th. ed. 1995).
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deter some sexually deviant beha~ior.~
However, there is little indication that incarceration alone
serves any rehabilitative function for sex offenders.6

In order to analyze legal and ethical issues surrounding legislation authorizing chemical
treatment of sex offenders, it is important to understand the method of treatment and whether its
effects give it the potential to achieve any of the legitimate goals of punishment or treatment. The
various statutes must then be examined to determine if any of them will Likely apply chemical
treatment for sex offenders in a manner that will achieve these goals.

A.

Chemical Treatment

Chemical treatment or chemical castration of sex offenders typically involves a weekly
injection of the drug medroxyprogesterone acetate or MPA.' This drug is marketed by Upjohn under
,->

the trade name Depo-~rovera.'MPA was initially approved by the FDA in the Iate 1950's for the
treatment of women experiencing irregutar uterine bleeding, amenorrhea, or threatened mi~camage.~

'Pamela K.Hicks, Commentary, Cmtration of Sexual Ofenders: Legal and Ethical
Issues, 14 J.. LEGALMD.641,645, Dec. 1993.

61d Some studies question whether recidivism rates of sex offenders are any higher than
recidivism rates of other violent offenders. Beth Miller, A Review of Sex OfSender Legadation 7SPG W.J.L. & PUB.POL'Y40, Spring 1998. However, statistics indicate that child molesters
repeat their offenses throughout their lifetime. Pamela K. Hicks, supra at 644; 'William Winslade
et al., Castrating Pedophiles Convicted of Sex Oflenses Against Children: Nau Treatment or Old
Punishment?, 5 1 SMU L. REV.349,359, .Tan.- Feb. 1998.
'~anielL. Icenogle, Sentencing Male Sex Offendersb the Use of Biological Treatments:
A Constilutional Analysis, 15 J. LEGALI ~ E D279,284,
.
June 1994.

.-...

'Philip J. Henderson, Notes, Section 645 of the California Penal Code: Calijornia 's
"Chemical Custrulion" Law - - A Panacea or Cruel and Um~sualPunishment?, 32 U .S .F .L.
REV.653,654, Spring 2998.
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The FDA withdrew approval of the drug in 1974 aRer studies on rhesus monkeys indicated a
connection between the drug and endometrial cancer, and studies on beagles suggested a nexus
between the drug and breast tumors.'* The drug was approved again in 1992.'' It is only indicated
as a female contraceptive,12and is not approved specifically fur treatment of sexual deviance.I3
However, because W A has FDA approval, it is not considered an experimental drug and may be
prescribed and used for unlabeled indications.I4
MPA has general side effects that include weight gain, lethargy, cold sweats, hot flashes,
nightmares, hypertension, elevated blood sugar, shortness ofbreath, headaches, abdominal pain, and
dizziness." Studies also indicate it may increase the risk of developing osteop~rosis.'~
When used
in men to treat sexual deviance, it is given at a dose more than 43 times higher than the dose given

-

to women for contraceptive purposes." An additional side effect experience by men receiving MPA

1°Id
"Id.

13

Larry Helm Spalding, Florida's 199 7 Chemical CmtrafionLaw:A Return to the Dark
Ages, 25 FLA.ST.U. L. REV. 7 17, 122, Winter 1998.

"Philip J. Henderson, supra at 655-656.
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is reduced testis size.'' The side effects of MPA are considered temporary and only continue so long
as the drug is being administered.19

MPA affects male sexual function by reducing the body's production of testo~terone..~~
It
thereby decreases the sex drive.21 MPA also has a tranquilizing effect22and reduces the ability of
some men to elicit erotic imagery.23However, one study found only half the men receiving treatment
responded with decreased fantasies." MPA does not have similar effects on

It neither

decreases the sex drive nor impairs sexual fantasy.26

MPA does not cause impotence in men.27While spontaneouserection and ejaculation do not
typically occur for men receiving MPA, these men can still experience erection and ejaculation when

'Qeth Miller, supra at ,367
2%arry Helm Spalding, supra at 122.

2%aniel L. Icenogle, supra at 284.
23

Karen J. Rebish, Nipping the Problem in the Bud: 7h-eConstilulr'onalityof Califomju 's
Castration Law,14 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM.RTS.507,5 16, Winter 1998.
"Daniel L. Icenogle, supra at 285.
2sRecentLegislation, Constitutional Law - Due Process and E q d Protection - California
Becomes First Shte to Require Chemical Castration of Certain Sex 0ffeender.s - Act of Sept. 17,
1996, Ch. 596, 1996 Cal Stat. 92 (to be Codified at Cal Penal Code S 645), 1 10 WARv. L. REV.
799,800, Jan. 1997.

27KarenJ. Rebish, supra at 5 18.
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efforts are made toward those ends.28 While MPA causes infertility in women, it does not cause
infertility in all men, and some men have fathered children while receiving MPA.~'However, it does
impair fertility in most men by reducing sperm counts and sperm motility.30 There is also evidence
that high doses ofMPA produce atypical sperm which could cause fetal abnormalities if impregnation

B.

Efficacy of Chemical Treatment of Sex Offenders

Whether chemical treatment of sex offenders is effective depends on what result is being
sought. If chemical treatment is imposed to mete out further retributive punishment for sex offenses,
it may be effective even if it does nothing to alter the offender's criminal disposition or behavior.32

If the goal is to incapacitate offenders so that they are unable to commit future criminal sexual acts,
the medical fact that MPA does aot cause impotence indicates that chemical treatment will be
ineffective toward this end. However, if chemical treatment is imposed to treat and rehabilitate
offenders, it has the potential to achieve this result.

?Daniel L. Icenogle, supra at 285.
301~
3'

Karen J. Rebish, supra at 5 17

32See,footnote 197, infa. A statute with an express purpose to mete out retributive
punishment would more likely violate the Eighth Amendment ban on Crud and Unusual

Punishment.
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Studies have shown MPA to be an effective treatment for some sexually deviant behaviors.33
However, it is not a panacea as it ody works for a small subset of the total class of sex offenders.j4

MPA is only effective in treating sexually deviant behavior in men3' It has no effect on women other
than as a ~ontraceptive.~~
Additionally, the effectiveness of treatment depends on the willingness of
the offender to undergo treatment,37and whether the offender fits into a category of offenders for
whom MPA treatment is eficacio~s.~*
Sex offenders can be cIassi6ed into four ~ategories?~
These are not the traditional categories
of offenders based on the type ofbehavior or offense cornrn~tted.~~
Rather, these are categoriesbased
on an offender's motivation to commit sexually deviant acts and his or her willingness to take
responsibility for the act.41Type I sex offenders do not take responsibility for the sex offense for
-

which they were ~onvicted.~'
They either deny the commission of the act itself or deny that-theact

33~illiam
Winslade et al., supra at 366-367.
34~ean
Peters-Baker, ChaIlenging Traditional Notions ofManagrng Sex Ofsenders:
Prognosis is Lijeelime Managemeni, 66 UMKC L. REV.629,646-647, Spring 1998.
"Recent Legislation, supra at 800.

37PhilipJ. Henderson, supra at 656
38rd
3%aren J. Rebish, supra at 518-519.

401dBut CJ Jean Peters-Baker, supra at 63 1-643. (profiling offenders based on traditional
categories).
41KarenJ. Rebish, supra at 5 18-519.
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was criminal in nature.43 Type II sex offenders admit the commission of the act and its criminal
nature, but deny personal re~ponsibility.~~
Instead, they place responsibility outside themselves on
non-sexual factors such as drugs, alcohol, or stress.45Type

sex offenders are motivated to commit

sex offenses by non-sexual factors.46 These offenders are violent and are motivated by anger or
p o ~ e r . ~MPA
'
is not effective in treating any of these three categories of sex offender^.^'

Type IV sex offenders do not deny their participation in sexually criminal or deviant acts and
are motivated by sexual facto~-s.~'
These offenders fit the traditional mental health classification of
paraphilia.50They show a pattern of sexual arousal, erection, and ejacuiation in response to a specific

deviant fantasy or act.51 Only sex offenders fitting into this category can be effectively treated with

MPA.s2
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It is important to note that occurrence of a particular behavior such as child molestation does

not make the actor a Type IV offender." A.personwho has committed a sex offense against a child
may fit into any of the four categories.54Furthermore, Type IV offenders may include sex offenders
who are not cbild molesters.55
Studies indicate that M P A treatment is only effective when the recipient of treatment is a

willing participant in the treatments6 MPA, by itself, does not cure paraphiliac tendencies or

behavior^.^' It must be accompanied by some fonn of counseling or therapy." All effects of MPA
are ternp~rary.~'
Without willing participation in therapy, sexually deviant behavior will likely return
when use of MPA is di~continued.~"
Additionally, an unwilling participant could conceivably engage
in paraphiliac behavior during the course ~ftreatrnent.~'
As noted above, while MPA reduces overall
-.

sexual desire, it does not render a man impotent." One study showed only minimal reduction in

53PfrilipJ. Henderson, supra at 656-657.

541d

55rd.
561dat 656.
57JeanPeters-Baker, supra at 654-655.

58rd.
'?Beth Miller, supra at 367.
60Philip J. Henderson, supra at 656.
'%aren J. Rebish, supra at 5 18.

621d

Chaylinn Ounning
Page 10

on sensual sexual activities of men receiving MPA treatment.63 An unwilling participant can also

counteract the effects of the MP A with steroid injections.&

MPA is not an effective treatment for women who exhibit sexually deviant behavior.65MPA
only affects the fertility of women.& It does not affect their sexual desire or behavior.67 While
women are not a large class of the total group of sex offenders, they are convicted of sexual offenses
against children in significant

Women are reportedly. involved in 5-14% of child sexuJ

abuse cases involving girls and 1424% of cases involving boys.@

Xn summary, MPA treatment of sex offenders has been shown to be an effective tool for
rehabilitating and treating some sexual de~iance.~'However, it is only effective when used in
conjunction with psychotherapy and close rn~nitoring.'~In order to ensure compliance with and
<-

benefits from treatment, participants must be wiIIing.'' MPA treatment is only effective for sex

%eth Miller, A Review ofsex Offender Legis/atron, 7-SPG W. J.L. &PUB.PoL'Y 40,
50, Spring 1998.

6S~hilip
J. Henderson, supra at 672,

66rd
67~ecent
Legislation, supra at 801.

68~illiam
Winslade et al., supra at 362,.
69rd,
701a!at 366-367.

7LJeanPeters-Baker, supra at 655.

72Philip5. Henderson, supra at 656.
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offenders who are motivated to commit their offenses by sexual d e ~ i r e It
. ~is not likely to alter the
deviant sexual behavior of persons motivated by violence, power or anger.74Nor is it likely to change
patterns of behavior for persons who deny responsibility for their offenses.''

Finally, chemical

treatment is only effective for male sex offender^.^^

C.

Efficacy of Chemical Treatment as Applied under Various Statutes

Five states have passed statutes authorizing or mandating chemical treatment of various

classes of sex offenders. 77 California was the first to pass legislation in 1996. Georgia, Montana,
Louisiana, and Florida each passed legislation in 1997. The efficacy of chemical treatment as it will
Iikely be applied under each of these statutory schemes depends, again, on the result each legislature
intended to obtain. If the intent of the legislation is purely retributive, the statute need only identie
C

the class of persons on whom it seeks retribution and apply the method of punishment. If, on the
other hand, the goal is rehabilitative, the efficacy of treatment as applied under a statute will depend
on the persons selected to receive treatment, the willingness of these persons to undergo treatment,
and the manner in which treatment is imposed. Each of the statutes differs on each of these factors
affecting efficacy.

73KarenJ. Rebish, supra at 5 18-519.

76RecentLegisltion, supra at 800.
"CAL. PENALCODE$645 (West 1998); GA.CODEANN. $5 16-6-4& 42-9-44.2 (1998);
RA.
STAT.ch. 794.0235 (1998); MONT. CODEANN. 5 45-5-512 (1998); LA.REV.STAT.ANN. 5
15 5 3 8 (West 1998).
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1.

The class of sex offenders affected by each statute and the method of selecting
individuals fiom the class.

As noted earlier, h4PA is only effective in treating persons who are motivated by sexual desire
and arousal to commit sexually deviant acts."' Each statute applies chemical treatment to particular
classes of sex offenders. Whether the chemical treatment will be effective under each depends on
the cIass of offender included under the statute, and the method, if any, of selecting particular
individuals fiom the class to receive treatment.
Florida applies its chemical treatment statute to any person committing a criminal act of sexual
penetration regardless of the age of the victim, but does not apply the statute to persons having
unlawful contact with minor children if the contact does not involve some form of sexual

-

penetratiom7' Because the statute does not include child molesters who might be motivated by sexual
desire but who do not engage in some form of sexual penetration with their victims, many persons
for whom chemical treatment might be effective wilI not be considered for treatment. Conversely,
because the statute applies to any person who commits rape, it may consider chemical treatment for
many offenders motivated by non-sexual factors for whom treatment will likely be ineffective. If the

goal of chemical treatment for sex offenders is to rehabilitate all those who are amenable to treatment,
this statute is under inclusive in identifying the class of persons who should be considered for
receiving treatment.

78KarenJ. Rebish, supra at 5 18-519.
'%LA.

STAT.~ h794.0235.
.
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The Florida statute provides for a method of selecting individuals fiom the class of offenders
to identify appropriate candidates fot treatment." In Florida, a person convicted of a second offense
of sexual battery will be sentenced to receive chemical treatment ifa court appointed medical expert
determines that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for treatment." This contingency has the
potential to ensure that chemical treatment I s not imposed on persons for whom it will not be
effective. If the screening process for appropriateness includes identification of an ogender's
motivation in committing the offense and his recognition of personal responsibility, efficacy of
treatment wilt be maximized within the ciass of persons considered for treatment. However, if the
screening only involves a determinationofmedical appropriatenesssuch as ensuring that the offender
is male, the statute will impose chemical treatment on many people who will receive no benefit.
The California statute has no method for determining the appropriateness of treatment for
individuals within the class of offenders identified to receive treatment." However, the statute does
allow the Department of Corrections to discontinue treatment when it is determined to be no longer

necessary.83This clause may allow theDepartment to forego treatment of persons for whom it would
be grossly inappropriate such as women. Nonetheless, the basic scheme under the California statute

is to require all persons falling within the targeted class of offenders to undergo treatment as a
condition of parole regardiess of individual factors affecting likely effectiveness of treatment.
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The California statute requiring chemical treatment applies to all persons who commit any
type of sexual offense against children under 13.84 If California is only concerned about preventing
recidivism among persons who target children, the statute is not under inclusive in identifying the
class of oEenders affected by the statute. However, because all offenders within this class will be

required to undergo treatment, the statute is over inclusive and MPA will be administered to persons
for whom treatment will not be effective.
Georgia has two chemical treatment statutes that differ significantly, so they must be treated
~eparately.~~
The Georgia sentencing statute allows the court to consider chemical treatment for
persons ~onvictedof aggravated child m o l e ~ t a t i o n . ~ ~ ~ g r a vchild
a t e dmolestation is defined as the
doing of any immoral or indecent act to, with or in the presence of a child under 16 when the child
7-

is child is physically injured or the act involves sodomy.87Persons who commit child molestation but
do not commit an act of sodomy or cause physical injury to the child are not considered for chemical
treatment under this statute.88The sentencing statute thus excludes many persons who target children
for sexual gratification and might benefit fiom chemical treatment.

The sentencing statute provides for selection of individuals appropriate for treatment fiom
among those convicted of aggravated child molestati~n.~
MPA treatment will be included in the

84~ii
"GA.CODEANN.

16-6-4 & 42-9-44.2.

86G~
CODE
. ANN. 5 16-6-4.

871d.

88rii.
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sentence only if a psychiatric evaluation ascertains that treatment will be effe~tiveto alter the
offender's behavior.* In this manner, the Georgia sentencing statute effectivelyassures that persons
selected for treatment at the time of sentencing will be those who are likely to receive rehabilitative
benefits fiom the treatment.
Conversely, Georgia's parole statute allowing for MPA treatment has no method of selecting
offenders who will benefit from treatment9' The Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles has
discretion to impose MPA treatment as a condition of parole for persons convicted of aggravated
childmolestationor convicted a second time for child rnolestati~n.~~
While the parole statute expands
the class of offenders considered for treatment, it has a reduced potential for applying treatment to
offenders who will most Iikely benefit from treatment. It is possible the Board might use their
n

discretion to determine the appropriateness of treatment before including it as a parole condition.
However, there is nothing in the statute requiring the Board to consider appropriateness when
exercising its discretion.
Application of MPA treatment under the Georgia statutes has the potential to be effective in
reducing recidivism and providing rehabilitation at the sentencing stage. However, treatment will
often not be offered to offenders who are capable of receiving the rehabilitative benefit. Application
of treatment at the parole stage has the potential of reaching more offenders who are likely to benefit
from treatment, but will also apply treatment to many persons who will receive no benefit.

9 1 G ~CODE
.
ANN. 5 42-9-44.2.

*rd
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The Louisiana statute authorizing chemical treatment of sex offenders applies to all persons

who have committed any form of rape, sexual battery, incest, or crimes against nature regardless of
the age of the victim.93The statute thus attempts to consider all potential appropriate candidates for
MPA treatment. Louisiana provides for selection of individuals to receive chemical treatment fiom
among the ~Iass.'~
This selection is based on a determination of the effectiveness of MPA treatment
for the individ~al.~'
Ali sex offenders are required to undergo some form of treatment designed to
effectively deter recidivism, reduce reincarceration, and protect the public.% MPA treatment is
among the treatment options.97 Treatment plans for each offender are based on a ,mental health
evaluation.98
Montana gives courts discretion to impose chemical treatment on persons convicted of sexual

--

contact or intercourse with a child under 16 without consent, and incest with a child under 16.39The
class of offenders is broad and includes all persons who have targeted children as victims of sex
offenses.Im The Montana statute authorizing MPA treatment of sex offenders resembles the
California statute in that it applies to all offenderswithin the identified class and has no provision for
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selecting particular individuals based on factors affecting amenability to treatment.''' The Montana

code differs in that MPA may be imposed at the discretion of the court, and courts are not required
to impose a sentence of h4PA treatment for any oEender.Io2Thus, there is potential for courts to selfimpose a selection criteria that includes a determination of an individual's appropriateness for
treatment based on the LikeIy effectiveness of treatment, However, the statute does not require that
individuals be selected based on their ability to benefit from treatment. Therefore, the Montana
statute has a potential equal to California's to impose MPA treatment on persons for whom it will
be ineffective.
2.

-

Wtllingness

MPA treatment of sexually deviant behavior is most effective when the treatment participant
is willing to undergo the treatment.'03 Willingness is not defined in the literature. It might be coextensive with consent. It might, however, be defined as a desire to participate in treatment and work
toward rehabilitation by eliminating deviant sexual desires and behaviors.
Consent issues,areaddressed in the next section of this paper. To the extent willingness might
be synonymous with consent, it is sufficient to state at this point that all of the statutes require some
type of consent before an offender receives MPA treatment.'& However, an offender may consent

hilip lip J. Henderson, mpra at 656.
104CAL.
PENAL CODE$645; GA.CODEANN. 5s 16-6-4 & 42-9-44.2; F I A . STAT.~ h .
794.0235;MONT.CODEANN. $45-5-512; LA.REV. STAT.ANN. 3 15538.All of the statutes
authorizing MPA treatment impose this treatment as a condition of parole either at the sentencing
stage of criminal proceedings or at the time parole conditions are set by the parole board, and all
of these states provide for conditional release on parole only when a prisoner has agreed to the
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to treatment for reasons other than a particular willingness to rehabilitate or work toward that end.
All of the chemical treatment statutes provide that the alternative to treatment is incar~eration.'~~
Thus, an offender may be motivated to give consent by a desire to avoid incarceration and may have
no desire to rehabilitate. If consent and willingness are mutually inclusive, and offenders need have
no desire to rehabilitate in order to obtain benefits fiom treatment, all of the statutes in force assure
that participants wiII be effectively treated to the extent willingness has an impact on efficacy.
On the other hand, ifwillingness to undergo treatment requires that aparticipant have a desire
to receive treatment, it may be that no jurisdiction will provide effective treatment to the extent
willingness aEects efficacy. None of the chemical treatment laws expressly address the te of an
offender to receive treatment as a criterion for

The only statutes that may allow for

.- -.

some form of screening of potential participants based on this factor are those that require a
determination of appropriateness before treatment is ordered. Thus, the California and Montana

conditions of parole. See, Ex Parte Peterson, 92 P.2d 890, 891 (Caf. 1939) (holding that consent
by a prisoner is a prerequisite to a valid conditional pardon), Todd v. Florida Parole & Probation
Commission, 4 10 So.2d 584, 585, 586 m a . Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the parole
commission has authority to withhold parole if the parties are unable to agree to conditions of
parole), Huff v. Aldredge, 14.S.E.2d 456,458,459 (Ga. 1941) (holding the Governor has
authority to attach any condition to parole which is not illegal, immoral, or impossible of
performance. Also holding that an unmet condition precedent for pardon renders the pardon
inoperative.), Bancroft v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 635 So.2d 738, 740 (La. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that a prisoner is not forced to accept parole, but chooses conditional
release), In re Hart, 399 P.2d 984, 985 (Mont. 1965) (holding that a prisoner is not required to
accept parole if he or she does not wish to accept the conditions of parole).

"'CAL. PENAL CODE 5 645; GA. CODEANN. $5 16-6-4 & 42-9-44.2; FLA. STAT.~ h .
794.0235;MONT.CODEANN. 9 45-5-512; LA.REV. STAT.ANN. 5 15538.
lo6Cm.
PENALCODE5 645; GA.CODEANN. $5 16-6-4 & 42-9-44.2; FLA. STAT.ch.
794.0235;MONT.CODEANN. 9 45-5-51 2; LA. REV. STAT.ANN. $ 1 5 5 3 8 .
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statutes will apply chemical treatment to unwilling offenders.Io7Florida, Louisiana, and Georgia,
however, could potentially order treatment only for those offenders with a desire to rehabilitate ifthe
criteria for appropriateness include willingness.lo8
3.

Manner of providing treatment

MPA treatment has been found to be effective for treating sexually deviant behavior only
when accompanied by psychotherapeutic intervention.'@ Thus, statutes requiring chemical treatment
of sex offenders without requiring some form of counseling will likely be ineffective in rehabilitating
or treating those offenders. In contrast, statutes identifjring appropriate individuals for chemical
treatment and requiring this be coupled with appropriate psychotherapeutic intervention will have a
higher probability of achieving rehabilitative and treatment goals.

Only the Georgia statutes require counseling as a co-requisite of MPA treatment."'
requirement is contained in both the sentencing and parole statutes.'"

This

The Louisiana statute

specifically allows an offender's treatment plan to include behavioral intervention as well as MPA
treatment.'''

However, there is no requirement that any fonn of psychotherapy be given

'07Ct%~.
PENALCODE 5 645; MONT.CODEANN. $45-5-5 I 2.
'08GA. CODEANN. $5 16-6-4 & 42-9-44.2; FLA.STAT.ch. 794.0235; LA.REV. STAT.ANN.

5 15:538.

'Og~eanPeters-Baker, supra at 655.
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simultaneously with the MPA treatn~ent."~
The California, Florida, and Montana statutes do not even
contain provisions that authorize a counseling requirement to accompany MPA treatment.'14 Thus,
Georgia has the highest probability of providing effective treatment to those among the selected class
who are otherwise appropriate candidates for treatment. Other states are less likely to provide
efficacious treatment or achieve effective rehabiiitation of offenders even for those who are otherwise
appropriate candidates for treatment.

D.

Medical Ethical Issues Implicated by Potential Inefficacious Administration of
Treatment

Based on the above analysis, it can be assumed that several states will authorize chemical
treatment of sex offenders for whom treatment will have little if any chance of success, For instaqce,
under the California andMontana statutes,l15it is likdy some offenders who are motivated by power
and violence will be required to receive MPA treatment as a condition of parole. MPA treatment wifl
probably be ineffective in even preventing these offendersfiom committing new offenses during the
course of treatment.'l6 Medical professionals administeringMPA treatment under these statutes may
be faced with an ethical dilemma if an offender presents him or herself for treatment and the medical
professional is aware that treatment will be ineffective for the particular offender.

'l3rd

" 4 C ~PENAL
~ . CODE5 645; FLA.STAT.ch. 794.023.5; MONT.CODEANN. 3 45-5-512.
" 5 C ~PENAL
~ . CODE5 645;MONT. CODEANN.

'IdBethMiller, supra at 53.

5 45-5-5 12.
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A medical doctor has no ethical duty to provide treatment at a patient's request when the
doctor knows the treatment cannot achieve the results desired by the patient.''' This does not address
whether a doctor has an ethical obligation to refuse to administer treatment when the doctor knows
the treatment cannot be effective. This issue may be amplified by the fact that M3PA treatment is
ultimately requested by the state. Does a doctor have an ethical duty to a sex offender patient to
refuse a govement's request to administer MPA treatment when the doctor knows treatment will
be ineffective? While a doctor does have an ethical obligation to respect the law,"8 a doctor also has

a fiduciary duty to his or her patients which includes an obligation to act in the patient's best

interest^."^ It is reasonable to believe that many doctors faced with ths dilemma would feel obligated
to refuse to administer MPA treatment.'''

' 1 7 BR.~FURROW
~
ET AL., BIOETH~CS:
HEALm CARELAW
AND ETHICS279 (3rd ed.
1997).

at 29, (reprinting the 1997 AMA Principles of Medical Ethics).

'l81a!

'IgSee,Eckhardt v. Charter Hospital of Albuquerque, 953 P.2d 722 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997);
Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 698 P.2d 435 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Cooper v. Curry,589 P.2d
201 (N.M. Ct. App, 1979).
'''But See, Pamela K. Hicks, Commentary, Castration of Sexual Offenders: Legal and
Ethical Issues, 14 J. LEGAL
~.IED.64 1, 665-666, Dec. 1993. (noting that some doctors oppose
mandatory chemical treatment of sex offenders because it is ineffective, and others oppose it
because it they believe using medical procedures as criminal penalties is unethical. However,
some doctors advocate the use of mandatory chemical treatment of sex offenders because of a
perceived connection between testosterone levels and violence.).
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.

ISSUESOFCONSENT

The matter of consent raises two distinct issues. First, informed consent of a patient is both
a legal and ethical requirement that must be met before medical treatment may be administered.12'
Secondly, consent to treatment that meets requirements for informed consent may be adequate as a
waiver of individual constitutional rights and preclude an offender from asserting some otherwise
valid constitutional ~1airns.l~~

A.

Informed Consent

Before a patient can receive any form of medical treatment, he or she must either give
informed consent to treatment or be provided the requisite due process for forcible administration of
medical treatment.'= All of the statutes authorizing the administration of MPA assume that offenders

-

will consent to treatment as none provide for the individualized determinations necessary for forcible

12'See,JOHN I,. DIAMOND
ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS103 (1996) (stating that a

medical doctor is liable in tort for performing a medical procedure without obtaining a patient's
informed consent). See also, BARRYR. WOW,
supra at 246. (stating that a patient with
decisional capacity may choose whether or not to undergo a medical procedure or treatment).
12'See, Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28, 29 (1992) (stating a guilty plea must be made
knowingly and voluntarily because it waives the right to trial by jury, the right to confkont one's
accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396
(1993) (outhning the standard for waiving the constitutionally guaranteed right to trial and right
to counsel).

he Supreme Court has held that forcible administration of medical treatment is a
significant intrusion of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Riggins v
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992), In order to justify this interference with a convicted person's
liberty, a state must show either an overriding justification that is reasonably related to the
treatment, or that treatment is necessary for the safety of the person or those around him or her.
Id. at 135. Additionally, the state must show that the treatment is medically appropriate and is the
least restrictive means of either satisfying the overridingjustification or protecting the person and
others. Id While a state could adopt a statutory scheme providing for forcible administration of
MPA, none have chosen to do so.
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administration of the

The principle of informed consent requires that a patient consent

to treatment after being informed of what a reasonable person would need to know in order to make
an informed and intelligent decision regarding the treatment.12' Several factors affect the validity of
consent including the information given, the competency of the patient giving consent, and the
voluntariness of the consent. Informed consent is absent when a patient has agreed to treatment but
has not been given adequate information about the treatment.Iz6Even when a patient has been
informed and has agreed to treatment, informed consent is lacking ifthe patient is not competent to
make such a de~ision."~
It is also possible that consent is inadequate when a patient's agreement to
a treatment method is not made voluntarily.'28
1.

Adequate Information

So long as offenders are given adequate information about MPA treatment prior to consenting
to treatment, states can easily avoid any question of invalid consent based on inadequate information.
Adequate information is given when a patient is informed of the nature of a treatment or procedure,
the risks associated with it, the likely results oftreatment, the risks associated with refbsing treatment,

and alternative methods of treatment.'29Thus, an offender would need to be given information about
the effects and side effects ofMPA, its efficacy or lack thereof in altering semtdly deviant behavior,
Iz4SeeFootnote 104, swpra,

125~orman
v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1993).
126'6J~HNL.
DLAMONDETAL., supra at 103.

l z 7 B ~R.yWOW,
supra at 246.
'28KrisW.Druhm, Comment, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California Penal Co& §
645, the Castration of Sex Oflenders and the Constitution, 6 1 Am. L.REV.2 8 5 , 3 08, 1 997.

Iz9See,Korman at 1145 ; Allan v Levy 846 P.2d 274 (Nev. 1993).
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any alternative methods oftreatment and the effectiveness of these.alternatives, and the risks involved
in refbsing treatment which likely include continued incarceration or reincarceration for future
criminally deviant behavior.
Not all of the statutory designs meet even the minimal requirement that offenders receive
adequate idormation about the treatment before giving consent. The Georgia statutes require that
an offender give actual informed consent,'30While Louisiana, Montana, and California require that
an offender be informed of the effects and side effects of MPA treatment, there is no express

requirement that an offender be given this information prior to giving consent to treatment.13'
Further, there is no requirement that an offender receive idormation on alternatives to MPA
treatment or risks associated with refusing treatment.'" The Florida statute does not contain any

-

express requirement that an offender be &en information about MPA treatment before his or her
consent is 0btaine~l.l~~
While the lack of express statutory requirements for informed consent may
not result in offenders consenting to treatment without receiving adequate information, it leaves open
the possibility of such an occurrence.
2.

Competence and Decisional Capacity

While it is relatively easy to assure that treatment is given only to persons who have received
adequate information, avoiding the administration of MPA to persons who are unable to give valid

I 3 ' C ~PENAL
~ . CODE5 645; MONT. CODEANN. 5 45-5-512; LA.REV. STAT. ANN.

5

15:538.

-

'32C~
PENAL
~ . CODE5 645; h&NT, CODEANN.
15:538.

' 3 3 F ~STAT.
~ . ch. 794.0235.

5 45-5-5 12; LA.REV. STAT. ANN. 5
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consent due to a lack of competence or decisional capacity requires greater consideration of the
principles of informed consent. 1f a person is not competent to make a particular decision regarding
health care, that person's agreement to a method of treatment does not constitute the requisite
informed consent even if that person has received a plethora of information about the treatment.134

In the past, courts and medical professionds viewed the determination of a person's ability
to make decisions as a question of competence.135Persons who were deemed competent were seen
as having the ability to make any d e ~ i s i 0 n . lConversely,
~~
persons who were not competent were
incapable ofmaking a decision under any circumstances.137Courts and medical professionals are now
more likely to attempt to determine a person's decisional capacity regarding a particular de~ision.'~'
There are several methods of determining a person's capacity to make specific

-

decision^.'^^ The

method that most closely parallels the law in the area of informed consentlMand has been accepted
by the American Psychiatric As~ociation'~'
requires that a patient have an ab2ity to understand the

134See,BARRYR. FURROWET AL., supra at 246-247. See also, Harris v. Leader, 499
S.E.2d 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (stating the general rule that consent is valid so long as it is
obtained fiom someone of sound mind).
' 3 5 R.
8 FURROW
~ ~ ET AL., supra at 247.

13616

I3'Id

at 248 and 250.

I4lPamelaK. Hicks, supra at 650
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information he or she is given regarding a method of treatment.l4' Thus, if a patient is given adequate
infomation about MPA treatment, but does not have an ability to understand that idormation, he or
she cannot give adequate consent.
Under all of the current statutes, it is likely that some individuals who are not competent will

fall into the class of persons considered for MPA treatment. Under several of the legislative schemes,
these offenders might be required to agree to treatment as a condition of parole in spite of their
inability to give valid consent. The MPA treatment laws in Georgia specifically require that an
offender give informed consent to

So Long as these requirements are implemented in

a manner that considers the decisional capacity of offenders, Georgia will avoid.administering MPA
to persons who cannot give valid consent because of a tack of decisional capacity. None of the other

-

chemical treatment laws has ,a consent requirement that mitigates this potential hazard. However,
those statutes that screen offenders for appropriateness to receive treatment might avert this pitfall
if the screening process includes a confirmation of an offender's competence to give valid consent.

Thus, in addition to Georgia, Louisiana and Florida may assure that offenders receiving treatment
have the decisional capacity to consent to treatment.144None ofthe other statutes provides a method
to assure that those who are treated have the decisional capacity to consent to treatment.
3.

Voluntariness

None of the chemical castration statutes currently in force addresses the requirement that
consent be voluntary. They all present an offender with a choice between accepting MPA treatment

lQ21d.See also, BARRYR.FURROW ET AL., mpra at 250.
143GA.CODEANN,

$5 2 6-6-4 & 42-9-44.2.

REV.STAT.ANN. $ 15:538; FLA.STAT.ch. 794.0235 .

1 4 4 ~ ~ .
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on the one hand and incarceration on the other.'45 Some appear more coercive than others. For

ill not receive parole and will serve
example, in California, anoffender who rehses MPA treatment w
the rest of his or her original sentence in prison.'& In Florida,14' an offender who refuses to comply
with MPA treatment is guilty of a second degree felony for which he or she will be sentenced to

additional years of incarceration.

It has been postulated that. consent to MPA treatment in the face of 'the alternative
incarceration is invalid because the threat of incarceration is a form of duress that renders the consent
in~oluntary.'~~
There is strong support for the premise that consent to medical treatment must be fiee

from imposition and undue influence in order to be valid. 14' Issues of informed consent are typically
raised in tort litigation under state law. Therefore, whether consent is invalidated by coercion, and
,--

whether a choice between incarceration and treatment constitutes coercion will be decided by each
I4'Ca. PENALCODE $645; GA.CODEANN. $ 5 16-6-4 & 42-9-44.2; FLA.STAT.ch.
794.0235; Mom. CODE ANN. 5 45-5-512; LA.REV. STAT. ANN. $ 15:538.

I4'Pamela K.Hicks, supra at 650-653.
"'See, Canterbury v Spence, 464 F.2d 772 at 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972). ( " . . . [Clonsent, to
be efficacious, must be fiee fiom imposition upon the patient.").
Both the law of torts and the law of contracts also address issues uf consent or agreement
and its validity in light of coercion or duress. In both tort and contract law, physical duress
invalidates consent and agreement. JOHNL. DIAMOND
ET PL.,
mpra at 35; E. &LEN
FARNSWORTH,
Cobn"i?~cTS
$ 4 . 1 6 (2nd ed. 1990). Tort law rarely recognizes coercion other than
ET AL., supra at 35.
actual physical threat as sufficient to negate consent. JOHN L. DIAMOND
Contract law, however, recognizes as improperly coercive a wider m a y of inducements including
any type of threat that would independently constitute a to~tiousact and, under many
circumstances, threats of criminal prosecution. E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH,
supra $4.17. Both tort
and contract law, however, recognize that most consent and agreement come about due to
situationd pressures and are rarely completely voluntary. JOHNL.DLAIvIoNDET AL., supra at. 35;
E ALLEN FARNSWORTH, sztpra 5.4.16.
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state as the issue arises. States addressing the issue may look to case Jaw from other jurisdictions
addressing ,similarissues.
Case law addressing the issue of voluntariness falls within three categories. One category
addresses the issue of whether consent to a plea bargain is voluntary notwithstanding the coercive
nature ofthe choices presented by a prosecutor. The second category of cases addresses the question
ofwhether persons who are in state custody cari give voluntary consent to medical procedures in spite
of the possibility that custody is inherently coercive. A tjllrd category addresses the issue of the
voluntariness of a person's consent to a criminal sanction that involves a medical procedure.
a.

Voluntariness of Consent to Plea Bargains

A convicted offender's consent is not normally at issue in the sentencing phase of criminal

proceedings because states do not generally offer sentencing options and need not obtain the consent

of a convicted individual in order to impose a given sentence.150However, a state must obtain a
defendant's consent to a plea bargain.15' Cases addressing undue influence by prosecutors and
coercive circumstances during plea bargaining have generally found that prosecutors have not abused
their discretion by threatening additional charges or harsher sentences in order to obtain a guilty plea

from a defendant.ls2 Courts have generally found that a plea is not involuntary simply because it is
induced by fear of harsher pen~dtlties."~The Supreme Court has even held that a guilty plea is valid

ISo~arnela
K. Hicks, supra at 65 1
151See,Parke, 506 U.S. at 28, 29.
'52E30rdenkircherv. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("Imposition o f . . . difficult choices
is an inevitable and permissible attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages
the negotiation of pleas.").
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when motivated by a desire to avoid the death penalty.154The Court has, however, found it relevant
that defendants faced with choices at the plea bargaining stage are represented by counsel.'s5 When

a convicted offender is offered parole with the condition he or she accept MPA treatment, he or she
will not have a right to c0unse1.l~~
This may be seen as si@cant in an analysis of the voluntariness
of such an agreement.
b.

Voluntariness of Consent in Coercive Environments

Cases addressing the voluntariness.ofconsent to medical procedures in coercive environments
such as prisons and mental institutionsleave open the question whether such coercion renders consent
invalid. On the one hand, there is case law suggesting that involuntarily committed persons cannot
give valid consent.'57 Conversely, there is case law indicating that a prisoner's consent to a medical
.-

procedure is voIuntary and valid even when the procedure is experimental and the prison environment

lS4I3radyV, United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) ("We decline to hold . . . that a guilty
plea is compelled and invalid . . . whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the
certainty or probability of a lesser penalty . . .")
"'"Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural
safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to prosccutorial persuasion,
and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation." Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (citing
Brady, 397 U.S. at 758).
lS6~agnon
v. Scarpelli, 41 1 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that a person convicted of a crime
has no 6th Amendment right to counsel at proceedings, such as parole revocation hearings, when
sentence has previously been imposed, but finding that a due process right to counsel might be
attach if a liberty or property interest is at stake in the proceedings.); Greenholtz v Inmates, 439
U.S. 817 (1978) (finding that inmates have no property interest in a mere possibility of parole, so
have no entitlement to due process protections for the granting or denial of parole).

--.

1S7~aimowitz
v Michigan Department of Mental Health, Civil Action No. 73- 19434-AW,
Circuit Court for Wayne County, 42 U.S.L.W. 101 (1973) (Cited to in Bailey v, Lally, 481 F.
Supp. 203 at 220 @. Md. 1979)) (holding; that an involuntarily committed patient in a mental
health facility was incapable of giving voluntary consent to an experimental surgical procedure
that posed significant risk and danger to the patient).

I
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is unpleasant.15' Courts examining whether sex offenders are capable of giving voluntary consent to

MPA treatment when faced with a choice between treatment and incarcerationwill likely give greater
weight to cases involving prisoners than cases involving involuntarily committed patients in mental
institutions because the issue of voluntariness in the latter cases is inextricably related to the issue of
competence.
c.

Voluntariness of Consent to a Medical Procedure as Part of a Criminal
Sanction

There is one case that addresses the voIuntariness of consent to a plea agreement involving
a medical procedure. Xn Briley v. C~lifttrnia,'~~
an accused child molester was offered a plea

agreement in which he was allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that with which he was
charged if he consented to surgical castration. Several years after the surgicai procedure, the
-.

recipient began experiencing adverse side effects. He brought a civil action against the State of
California al!eging that he had been coerced into giving conseht for the procedure. The court held
that a trial judge had improperly dismissed the complaint and that the recipient of the castration had
stated a valid claim.lm However, the court also found that the State of California would be immune
from liability if the prosecutor were found to have had statutory authority to offer the plea
conditioned on surgical castration.

A court addressingthe voluntcuinessof a sex offender's consent

lS8~ailey
v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 221 @. Md. 1979) (distinguishing Kaimowitz and
holding that the consent of inmates to participate in medical research was voluntary because
prisoners had a viable choice whether or not to participate, and unpleasant aspects of institutional
life dd.idnot coerce the consent).
"'564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977).
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to MPA treatment may find this case only minimally idornative on the issue of consent. If anything,
it implies that a valid claim of coercion rests on oficial misconduct which will not be found when

there is statutory authority for the conduct.
d.

Summary of Voluntariness to MPA Treatment

A state addressing the issue of whether a sex offender's agreement to parole conditioned on

MPA treatment is valid consent or invalid based on coercive circumstances will likely consider all the
elements weighed in the above cases. Courts may start with a threshold assumption that the consent

is valid based on cases holding plea agreements valid in spite of defendants being given difficult
choices. A court may distinguishcase law which holds that involuntarily committed patients in mental
health facilities cannot give valid consent by noting likely differences in decisional capacity between
7

prisoners and mental health patients.'62Further, a court may find that MPA treatment does not pose
a sigfljficant risk or danger to recipients and may find germane the fact that MPA treatment is
authorized by statute. Weighed against these factors will be other considerations. For instance, a
court may find it quite relevant that most prisoners will not have the benefit of counsel when

considering the conditions of their parole. It may also be found pertinent that consent to MJ?A
treatment is a requisite to release from incarceration.
4.

Medical Professional Ethics and Valid Consent

Even if state courts find the consent to MPA treatment legally valid under these statutes, there
is still the possibility that medical professionals will believe the consent is invalid fiom an ethical
perspective. A medical doctor is ordinarily required to obtain the informed consent of a patient

16'See, Bailey 48 1 F. Supp. at 22 1.
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before providing treatment or performing a medical procedure.'63Failure to secure this consent may
give rise to a tort claim for negligence or even intentional battery.164Consent also implicates a
and general principles of medical ethics.166The ethical
doctor's fiduciary duty to his or her patients165
responsibilities of a doctor include respect for human dignity, honesty with patients, and respect for
the rights of patients.I6' The fiduciary relationship between a doctor and patient implies a
responsibility on the part of the doctor to act for a patient's benefit and is the highest standard of duty
implied by law.168

The medical profession has long recognized that voluntariness is an importar? component of
consent. TheNuremberg Code, promulgated by the Nuremberg court after World War LI, stated that
subjects of medical experiments must give voluntary consent which is not obtained through duress,
-.

overreaching, constraint, or ~ 0 e r c i o n . lThe
~ ~ medical profession is also aware that prisoners are a
vulnerable class of persons whose capability to give voluntary consent is suspect. Federal regulations
on research involving human subjects take note of this vulnerability.170W e MPA treatment is not
experimental, thus does not have to meet the criteria for research on human subjects, the guidelines

' 6 3 J o ~ LDZAMOND
.
ET AL.,supra at 103.
1641d.
165See,footnote 119, inta.
'66BARR~
R.FURROW ET AL., supra at 29-30.

16'1d.

1 6 8 ~ LAW
~ ~DICTIONARY
~ ~ ' s 43 1 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
1

6

%

R.~ FURROW
~
~ ET
~ AL., supra at 379.

17'*45 C.F.R.
Part 46 Sec. 46.3 1l(3) (1998).

Cherylinn Gunning
Page 33

set forth in the Nuremberg Code and federal regulations evidence a long-standing awareness that
voluntariness is an ethically required component of consent,

In addition to ethical dilemmas surrounding the voluntariness of consent, medical
professionals will likely have ethical issues with the administration of MPA to specific offenders
whose competency to give valid consent is questionable. They may also find it unethical to administer
MPA treatment to offenders whose consent was not preceded by information regarding the treatment.
Notwithstanding the provisions of any statute, doctors have an independent responsibility to ensure
that valid and adequate consent has been obtained from patients.17'
Most of the statutes authorizing MPA treatment of sex offenders contain provisions that
indicate legislative awareness of potential legal and ethical dBculties surrounding implementation
I-

of these statutes. The California and Montana statutes provide that no doctor employed by the state
can be required to administer MPA treatment against her or his will.17* The Georgia and Louisiana

statutes provide immunity fiom civil and criminal liability for doctors administering MPA treatment
under provisions of those statutes.173It is worth noting that these legislative bodies have chosen to
protect medical professionals fiom the consequences of potentially invalid consent but have not
opted to maximize the Iikelihood of valid consent by designing st-atutoryprovisions that take fill
account of all the factors affecting the validity of consent.

17'This responsibility has also been long recognized. See, BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL.,
supra at 379. brinting The Nuremberg Code which provides that the duty to determine the
quality of consent is a personal responsibility that cannot be delegated).
'"CAL. PENAL
CODE5 645; 'MONT.CODEANN. 5 45-5-512.

'"GA. CODEANN. $5 16-6-4 & 42-9-44.2; LA.REV.STAT.ANN.

5 15 :538.
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38.

Impact of Consent on Possible Constitutional Claims

As noted above, none of the statutes authorizing chemical treatment of sex offenders pennit
treatment to be forcibly administered. Sex offenders will give some Ievel of consent before MPA
treatment begins even if this consent is merely an agreement to the conditions ofparole. This consent
may affect an offender's ability to challenge MPA treatment on constitutional grounds. Persons have
the ability to waive some of their constitutional rights.174Whether consent to MPA treatment is
sufficient to waive a constitutional claim depends on whether the consent meets the requirements of

an adequate waiver of constitutional rights and whether a particular constitutional right or claim may
be waived.
I.

Standard for Waiving Constitutional Rights

The Supreme Court has held that constitutional rights may be waived if the waiver is made
voluntarily and intelligently.'75 The Court has also required a waiver be made ~ornpetently.'~~
This

standard closely parallels the standard for informed consent.'" Thus, jf a sex offender's consent to
receive MPA treatment is deemed valid, it may also serve as a waiver of some, if not all, possible
constitutional claims an offender might have regarding the MPA treatment.

It may be that the standard for waiving a constitutiod right is higher than the standard for
informed consent. The Court has stated that there must be evidence a person has intentionally

174See,Parke, 506 U.S. at 28,29; Godinez, 509 U.S. at 346.

'75See,Parke, 506 U.S. at 29.
"76See,Godinez, 509 U.S, at 396.
'"Bailey v. Lally, 48 1 F. Supp. 203 @. Md. 1979) (finding, without addressing the issue
of waiver, that prisoners' constitutional rights to privacy had not been violated because the
prisoners had given informed consent to participate in medical research.).
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abandoned a right in order for a waiver of that right to be effecti~e."~
The Court has also required
that a waiver of constitutional rights be clear.179Additionally, there is a strong presumption against
waiver of constitutional rights.''' If there is a higher standard for waiver of constitutional rights, it
is possible a sex offender could give vdid consent to MPA treatment without waiving any potential
constitutional claims as a result. If the consent to treatment were not a clear and intentional
abandonment of constitutional rights, it would not meet such a higher standard.
2.

Waiver of Particular Constitutional Rights

Even if valid consent to treatment woufd also be a valid waiver of constitutional rights, it is

likely it would not waive all possible constitutional claims. It is probable that a sex offender could

waive his or her liberty interests protected under theFourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.'*'
I-..

It is less likely, however, that an individual will be found to have the ability to waive any claim he or
she might have under' the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.'g2

'78~rookhart
v. h i s , 384 U,S. 1,4 (1.966) (stating that a waiver of the right to conf?ont
witnesses against oneself must evidence an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege).
17')Fuentesv. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,95 (1972) (stating a waiver of constitutional rights,
even in a civil context, must be clear).
l S 0 ~ hCourt
e
in BruoWtarr stated, "There is a presumption against the waiver of
constitutional rights." 384 U.S. at 4.
'*l~qualprotection analysis and substantive due process analysis are often used as
alternative means of determining whether a law impermissibly impairs an individual constitutional
D.ROTUNDA,
CONS~ONA
LAW
L fj 11.7 (5th ed. 1995).
right JOHN E. NOWAK& RONALD
Thus a valid waiver of a liberty interest should waive any claim an offender might have under both
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

lWStatev Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410,411,412 (S.C. 1985) (holding that protection from
cruel and unusual punishment under the state constitution of South Carolina cannot be waived
because such punishment is against public policy).
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a.

Waiver of Liberty Interests Protected Under the Fourteenth ,
Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part, "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of

Deprivation is defined as the taking away or

confiscation of a right.lg4At the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment is the protection of individual
autonomy and choice-making. Thus, if a person freely and autonomously chooses to accept a
government action upon him or her, that person's rights have not been violated.
The Supreme Court has recognized the protection of fbndamental privacy rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has specificdly included interests in the right to marry,to have
children, to direct the education and rearing of one's children, to marital privacy, to the use of

-

contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion as among those protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.lS5A sex offender required to receive chemical treatment could easily argue that a state

S. CONST.amend. MV,

8 1.

' 8 4 ~ ~ ~DICTIONARY
~ ~ ' s304L(abr.
~ ~6th ed. 1991). As a logical deduction, something
which can be taken can also be given up freely, and something which is given up has not been
taken. See, Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Company, 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (stating that
procedural due process rights may be waived in a civil context). See also, Reno v Fiores, 507
U.S. 292, 309 (1993) (holding that juvenile aliens may waive their due process rights to a hearing
before an immigration judge).

--.

185Washingtonv Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct, 2258,2267 (1997) (finding that the Due Process
Clause protects these hndarnental liberties against governmental interference). Paui v Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 713 (1976)(holding that states' powers to regulate individual conduct in these areas are
limited by concepts of liberty found in the Fourteenth Amendment).
An expansive reading of the Court's decisions might indicate a willingness on the part of
the Court to protect a broad range of privacy interests including a general right to sexual identity.
See, Romer v Evans, 5 17 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a Colorado law forbidding
enactment of protections for homosexuals as a class violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). However, the Court has recently indicated a reluctance to expand the
privacy interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258,
2267 (holding that protected privacy rights do not include a right to die, and stating, "we have

,

I
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had interfered with his or her liberty interest in a marital relationship, procreation, or bodily integrity.
However, because the policy underlying the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially the protection of
individual autonomy, if an offender gives valid informed.consent to chemical treatment, it is likely he
or she will be seen as having waived any constitutional rights protected under the ~ m e n d r n e n t . ' ~ ~

5.

Waiver of Rights Under the Eighth Amendment Ban on Cruel and
Unusual Punishment

Whether a person may waive his or her right to be free from cruel and unusual

is an issue that has not been raised under the federal con~titution.'~~
A federal court faced with this
issue would reasonably consider the policy implications of allawing an individual to waive protections
under the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has addressed policy

always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process . .").

' 8 6 ~ h comment
is
does not attempt a full analysis of a Fourteenth Amendment claim arising
fiom statutes authorizing chemical treatment of sex offenders. Such analysis can be found in
several law review articles including Kris W. Druhm, supra; Daniel L Icenogle, supra; Karen J.
Rebish, supra; Recent Legislation, supra; Beth Miller, supra; Larry Helm Spaiding, supra;
William Winslade et al., supra; Bryan Keene, Note, Chemical Castration:An Analysis of
FIoridcl 's New "CuttingEdge " Policy Towardr Sex Criminals,49 FLA. L. REV. 803, Dec. 1997;
Kimberly A. Peters, Comment, Chemical Castrafion:An Alternative to Incarceration, 3 1 DUQ.
L. REV. 307, Winter 1993; Kay-Frances Brody, Comment, A ConstilutionalAnulysis of
California 's Chemical CasrraiionStatute, 7 TEMP,POL & CIV.
RTS.L. REV. 141, Fall 1997;
Jason 0.Runckel, Comment, Abuse it a~zdLose it: A Look at California'sMandatoy Chemical
Castration Law, 28 PAC.L.J. 547, Spring 1997.
18'u.S. CONST.amend. VIlI reads, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
finesimposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

.-

1883utsee, filmore v Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) in which the mother of a death row
inmate was held to have no standing to bring a claim of cruel and unusual punishment when the
inmate was found to have knowingly and intelligently waived any rights he might have asserted
following sentencing. Justice White, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated
that, "[Tlhe consent of it convicted defendant in a crimind case does not privilege a State to
impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 1018.
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considerations regarding waiver of individual dghts and stated that a waiver which substantially
impairs the policy underlying those rights may be unenfor~eable.'~~

In his opinion in Trop v. D u l l e ~ , 'Chief
~ Justice Warren stated that, "'The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the
power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
The Eighth Amendment, then, protects more than individud rights. It
civilized ~tandards.'''~~
protects society itself from its own potential to become uncjvilized. It protects humanity and the

dignity of humankind. If a sex offender were able to consent to punishment that was cruel and
unusual, this would undermine the societal protections inherent in the Eighth Amendment. Thus, if

'89TownofNewton v. Rumery, 480 U,S. 386, 392 & n.2(1987) (deciding that a
defendant could be required to waive a right to sue under federal statute as a condition of the
dismissal of criminal charges. The Court did hypothesize that a waiver that substantially impaired
the policies underlying the right would be unenforceable. In this case, the Court iooked to
contract law for the basic common law principle that an agreement that would harm public policy
in its enforcement is unenforceable).
'*356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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state imposed chemical treatment of sex offenders were found to be c w I and unusual punishment192,
an order for such treatment would be invalid despite the consent of the ~ E e t l d e r . ' ~ ~

IV.

POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDINGLEGJSLATTONFOR CHEMICAL TREATMENT OF
SEX OFFENDERS

As previously noted, each of the current statutes in force that authorize chemical treatment
of sex offenders has limitations regarding the effectiveness of treatment. Additionally, most of the
legislation could be attacked on Eighth Amendmentlg4and Fourteenth Amendment grounds..'95
However, h P A treatment can be an effective means of rehabilitation for .many sex offenders. It

he threshold inquiry is whether chemical treatment is punishment. It must be either

,---

punitive in purpose or effect. See, Trop v Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1968) (plurality opinion) (stating
that whether a law is penal in nature is dependant upon the purpose of the statute); Kennedy v
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (Considesing seven factors to determine whether a
sanction is punitive in effect absent conclusive evidence of a legislative purpose to punish:
whether the sanction imposes a disability or restraint, whether it has historically been viewed as
punitive, whether it has retributive or deterrent effects, whether the behavior to which it applies is
criminal, whether it can be rationally related to an alternative purpose, and whether it is excessive
in relation to any alternative purpose). If a sanction is determined to be punitive, it will violate the
Eighth Amendment if it is found to be cruel and unusual. The Supreme Court has held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits both barbaric punishments and those that are disproportionate to the
crime committed. See, Solem v Helm, 463 U.S. 277,284 (1983) (using a three part test for
proportionality by examining the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty,
comparing the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and comparing the
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions). But see, Harmelin v Michigan, 50 I
U.S. 957, (1991) (with six justices agreeing in various opinions that proportionality was required
in non-capital cases, but not agreeing on a test for proportionality outside the context of the death
penalty).
This comment does not attempt an analysis of an Eighth Amendment claim arising from
statutes authorizing chemical treatment of sex offenders. Such analysis can be found in various
law review articles including, Larry Helm Spalding, supra; Daniel L Icenode, strpra; Karen J.
Rebish, supra; Kimberly Peters, supra; Jason 0.Runckel, supra;William Winslade et al,, supra;
Kris W. Druhrn, supra;Philip J. Henderson, supra.
lg3Butsee, Gilmore 429 U,S. at 1012 .
lg4See,footnote 194, supra, and accompanying text.

lg5See,footnotes 186-188, supra, and accompanying text.
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would seem, then, that MPA treatment should be made available to those who will benefit fiom its
effects. The primary poticy concern is whether there is a method of making this treatment available
in a manner that maximizes the treatment benefits without violating the civil rights of convicted sex
offenders.
The Texas legislature passed a statute in 1997 authorizing the state to provide .an
orchiectomy, or surgical castration, to persons convicted of sexual offenses.'% Under this statute,
a sex offender may only undergo this procedure if he does so voluntarily, and there are multiple
safeguardsto assure voluntariness and appropriateness of the procedure.lg7The voluntariness of the
procedure guarantees that it will not violate a convicted sex offender's Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights."* The voluntariness of the procedure also precludes a finding that the statute is
-

punitive, thus excluding the possibility of violating the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment .IwThis statute may do little, if anything, however, to satisfy societal concerns regarding

'%x. GOV'TCODEANN. 5 501.061 (West 1998).
'97Thestatute requires that an offender have been convicted at least twice of sexual
offenses, be over 21 years of age, request the procedure in writing, receive counseling and a
psychiatric or psychological evaluation, and give informed, written consent. A special monitor is
required to advise an inmate to withdraw the request if the monitor perceives the request was in
any way coerced, The inmate may withdraw the request at any time prior to the procedure, and
an inmate who has once requested the procedure and subsequently withdrawn the request is
ineligible to receive the procedure in the fbture. Id. Additionally, a judge is not permitted to
require the procedure as a condition of community supervision. TEX.C m . P. CODE 5
42.12(1I)(f) (West 1998). Nor may a judge or jury be made aware of a defendant's plans to
undergo an orchiectomy prior to sentencing that defendant. TEX.CFUM.P. CODE5 37.07(3)(h)
(West 1998).
19&See,
footnotes 185-188, supra, and accompanying text regarding consent and waiver of
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights.
'%ee, footnote 194, supra, regarding the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Cruel and
Unusu.al Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
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long-term incapacitation of sex offenders. Because it provides no incentives for an offender to select
surgical castration, it is not likely to be implemented by large numbers of offenders and will have little
effect on recidivism rates in Texas. Therefore, it may not be the model upon which to base a statute
authorizing chemical treatment for sex offenders.

A model statute would combine some of the aspects of the Texas statute, all the best features
of several ofthe statutes in force authorizing chemical treatment ofsex offenders, and some additional
components to provide chemical treatment as one option for sex offenders. As a first step., such a
statute would need to allow chemical treatment for any convicted sex offender, regardless of the age
I

of the victim, or the type of sexual offense. h this respect, such a statute would most closely
resemble the current statute in ~lorida.~*

A model statute should require an individualized treatment plan for each offender that
attempts to provide some method oftreatment likely to reduce recidivism. h this, the statute would
resemble that of ~ouisiana.~~'
However, a model statute would include provisions ensuring an
offender's fully informed and voluntary consent to any treatment recommendations. Such a statute
would also guarantee that chemical treatment was accompanied by counseling. Finally, such a statute
I

woujd incorporate terms for identifying persons appropriate for chemical treatment that would

'

maximize the effective use of chemical treatment given the individual for whom it was being
considered. As noted previously, only sexual ofFenders who acknowledge responsibility for sexually
deviant behavior and who are motivated by sexual desire are amenable to chemicd treatment.202

'%A.

STAT. ch. 794.0235.

REV. STAT.ANN. 5 15338.

2 0 ' ~ ~ .

202KarenJ. Rebish, supra at 5 18-5 19.
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Thus, a model statute would assess each individual offender to determine his appropriateness for
chemical treatment.
A model statute authorizing chemical treatment for sex offenders would need to strike a

balance in offering incentives for sex offenders to choose chemical treatment. On the one hand, a lack
of incentives, as there are in the Texas statute authorizing surgical castration203,renders a statute
ineffective in having any real impact on recidivism. On the other hand, incentives that are overly
attractive, such as oEering chemical treatment as the only alternative to We in prison without parole,

may rise to the level of coercion. A model statute would d o w a board of parole to consider the
individualized treatment plan for an offender and the recommendations ofprofessionalsregarding the
potential success ofthe offender in treatment when deciding whether to grant parole and when setting

-

the conditions of parole. Such a statute would set guidelines indicating that offenders should be
granted parole only if they have been found amenable, to some extent, to some form of treatment.
Further, such a statute could state that parole should be granted only when the persons developing
the treatment plan with the offender believe he or she has selected a treatment method with some
potential to alter deviant sexual behavior. A model statute would also authorize the state to pay for
the costs of a treatment plan when an offender has agreed to the form of treatment to which he or she

has been found to be most amenable.204Finally, a model statute would provide an offender with legal
counsel when making final decisions regarding their individual treatment plan to assure the offender
is aware of all of his or her rights and the legal ramifications of any decision made.

*031Zx,OV'T
CODEANN.
204

5 501.(Xi1

Most statutes require an offender to pay aII costs of his or her parole, including the
costs of chemical treatment. See e g . , LA.REV.STAT.ANN.5 151538.
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Chemical treatment with medroxyprogesterone acetate can have a positive influence on the
deviant sexual behavior of some sex offender^.^" For this reason, statutes authorizing this treatment
for offenders who fall within the category of persons who are able to benefit from treatment can be
advantageous for both sex offenders and the society in which they will live following incarceration.
However, statutes that mandate chemical treatment as a condition of probation for all sex offenders
can do more harm than good. Among the problems already considered in this comment are
ineffective treatment, questions regarding the constitutionality of such statutes, potential liability for
administering treatment absent informed consent, and potential ethical concerns of physicians
regarding the administration of treatment either because of a lack of eEcacy or lack of valid cansent.
Several authors have pointed out that such statutes may also cause harm by giving society a false

-

sense of security because people will have a tendency to believe offenders have been incapacitated
by administration of MPA when, in fact, MPA will only reduce the recidivism of a particular group
of offenders.206Therefore, while chemical treatment for sex offenders should be offered by the states,
none of the current statutes in force authorizes the treatment in a manner that satisfactorily avoids
h a d l consequences to both the sex offenders who may receive treatment and the society of which

these offenderswill be a part. Each of the states with current statutes should amend these to increase
the chances of successfbl implementation, and states considering similar laws should consider drafting
IegisIation for the primary purpose of providing treatment rather than inflicting societal retribution.

205WtlliamWinslade et al., supra at 366-367.
'06See, Beth Miller, supra at 45, 53.

